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Board roles in organisations with a dual board system: Empirical evidence from 
Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations 
 
Abstract 
Research on the roles of the board of unitary board systems is well established, while 
explorations of dual board systems are very limited. We know little about nonprofit 
sport organisations board roles in countries, such as Taiwan, that operate with a board 
dual structure. In consequence, this study explored the roles taken by the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors in Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations. Four 
overarching board of director roles were identified: manage vision and purpose; board 
duty; human resource and fundraising; and stakeholder focus. For the board of 
supervisors two primary functions emerged: monitoring results; and board duty and 
process. The findings of the study extend our understanding of the governance of 
nonprofit sport organisations and the differences that exists between dual board and 
single board systems of governance.  
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Identifying the role of boards that govern nonprofit sport organisations has attracted an 
increasing amount of attention from a number of researchers (Ferkins et al., 2005; 
Forster, 2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Inglis, 1997; Shilbury, 2001). The role that 
government funding agencies believe these boards should fulfil has also been articulated 
in various statements of governance principles and guidelines (Australian Sports 
Commission, 2002; 2005; Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC), 2004; 2007; 
UK Sport, 2004). These research efforts and guidelines have, however, been primarily 
focused on boards that operate within single tier board systems. 
 
Outside of the nonprofit sport sector, there is also a significant body of research into the 
roles of individual board members in for-profit organisations (Dulewicz and Herbert, 
1999; Kula, 2005; Jonsson, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; Long et al., 2005; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and other 
nonprofit organisations (Cornforth, 2001; Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; Iecovich, 2004; 
Inglis et al., 1999) that has also focused on boards and board members operating within 
single tier board systems. The many sets of governance guidelines developed by stock 
exchanges and corporate regulatory agencies also tend to focus on the single tier board 
systems, as this is the most common board system in the majority of westernized 
economies. 
 
There are, however, a number of countries that require the use of dual or two-tier board 
systems. The board structures adopted by countries such as China, Germany, Japan and 
the Netherlands are characterised by a two-tier board system composed of a board of 
directors and a board of supervisors. While research on board roles in these settings has 
been growing (Bezemer et al., 2007; Cooke & Sawa, 1998; Dahya et al., 2003; 
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Koladkiewicz, 2001; Maassen & Van den Bosch, 1999; Nietsch, 2005; Rose, 2005; 
Schilling; 2001; Xiao et al., 2004), few studies have empirically examined board roles 
in nonprofit organisations that operate with a dual or two-tier board system. Indeed, 
there is a growing call for conducting research designed to identify the functions and 
machinations of the board of directors and supervisors in these settings (Dahya et.al., 
2003; Turnbull, 1997; Xiao et al., 2004). 
 
Nonprofit Taiwanese sport organisations must utilise a dual board system in which a 
board of directors and a board of supervisors are provided the same legal status. The 
purpose of this paper is to present the results of a study that sought to identify the 
respective roles of the board of directors and the board of supervisors for nonprofit sport 
organisations operating with a dual board system in Taiwan. In addition, the process of 
board member selection, the demographic composition of the respective boards and the 
contribution of each board to the organisation’s operations were explored. 
 
The Civil Organisation Law of Taiwan requires all nonprofit organisations to register as 
a civil organisation under a relevant government body, such as the Ministry of the 
Interior, and stipulates basic requirements for the establishment, operation and 
governance of nonprofit organisations, including the adoption of a dual board system. 
The Civil Organisation Law, however, fails to clearly outline the respective roles of 
each of these boards, and requires nonprofit organisations to establish their own internal 
regulations for how these boards should operate. While generic descriptions of the 
respective roles of boards of directors and boards of supervisors can be found in the 
internal regulations of Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations, there is little reported 
research that has examined the roles that directors and supervisors actually perform in 
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this dual board system. The following sections review the literature related to board 
roles in sport organisations, the dual board system in Taiwan, and relevant research that 
has been conducted into dual board systems.  
 
Board roles in sport organisations 
Governance has been identified as influential in the performance of sport organisations 
because of its pivotal role in setting policy and direction for the organisation (Ferkins et 
al., 2005; Hoye, 2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In a governance system, the board has 
a critical responsibility of ensuring that the activities of the organisation are carried out 
in the best interests of the organisation (Australian Sports Commission (ASC), 2005). 
The importance of governance has been well-recognized by government bodies that 
fund and support sport organisations and by sport organisations themselves. Several 
authorities have outlined the parameters of board roles in sport organisations (ASC, 
2005; European Olympic Committee, 2001). The ASC (2005, p. 3) identified eleven 
key roles for the board of a nonprofit sport organisation as: 
1. Strategic planning – defining, driving and monitoring the organisation’s 
strategic direction, priorities and results. 
2. Stakeholder involvement – defining key relationships, interacting with 
stakeholders to inform them of achievements and ensuring that stakeholders 
have input into determining strategic goals and direction. 
3. Enhancing the organisation’s public image – promoting the organisation in a 
positive light and performing ‘ambassadorial’ duties. 
4. Organisational performance – reviewing, monitoring and ensuring management 
and organisational performance. 
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5. Reporting – reporting to members and stakeholders at the annual general 
meeting. 
6. Policy formulation – establishing the board-level policy framework for 
governing the organisation, from which all operational policies and actions are 
developed. 
7. Management of the CEO – appointment, management and review, providing 
advice and guidance and rewarding the CEO as appropriate. 
8. Legal compliance – monitoring organisational compliance with relevant federal, 
state and local legislation, and the organisation’s constitution. 
9. Management of financial resources – approving the allocation of funds through 
the annual budget, striving to secure the resources required and ensuring sound 
financial management of the organisation. 
10. Risk management – ensuring the risks facing the organisation are identified and 
assessed, ensuring a risk management plan is established, regularly reviewing 
this plan to ensure its effectiveness and monitoring compliance with it. 
11. Board effectiveness – carrying out board business through productive meetings, 
engaging in regular self-assessment and evaluation, and initiating board 
development 
 
However, the actual roles performed by the boards of nonprofit sport organisations may 
not reflect these normative guidelines or principles. Somewhat surprisingly there have 
only been two significant studies that have explored the roles of sport boards. Inglis’s 
(1997) study of executive directors, board presidents and board members of Canadian 
nonprofit sport organisations grouped board roles into four factors with 16 items. The 
four key roles were: 1. Mission—ethical responsibilities, following charters, and 
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keeping policies in line with mission; 2. Planning—financial policy, budget allocations, 
human resources and long-range plans and strategies; 3.Executive Director—hiring and 
monitoring of the executive directors as well as concern for fulfilling legal 
responsibilities; and 4.Community Relations—developing and delivering specific 
programs and services, representing the interest of certain groups, raising funds, and 
promoting advocacy and community relations. Notably, there was a significant 
difference in the perception of paid staff and board members and male and female 
members of the importance and performance of board roles.  
 
A study of Australian sport boards found that strategy, developing financial policies, 
and budgeting were perceived as the most important board roles in sport organisations 
(Shilbury, 2001). In this study paid staff were found to have influence over issues that 
were historically the purview of the board (Shilbury, 2001). These empirical 
investigations of what boards actually do in their sport organisations has provided a 
basis for current understandings of board roles within nonprofit sport organisations.  
 
Dual boards in Taiwan 
As previously mentioned, the Civil Organisation Law of Taiwan requires nonprofit 
sport organisations to establish two boards, a board of directors and a board of 
supervisors (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). The status of the board of directors and the board 
of supervisors are equal (Solomon et al., 2003), and the dual board system is common to 
both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors in Taiwan. Members of the board of directors 
and supervisors are volunteers who are elected by the organisation’s members. 
Individual board members can be removed by the general assembly (where all 
organisational members meet yearly or regularly and have equal representation) if they 
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are found violating Taiwanese laws, organisational regulations and/or decisions made 
by the general assembly (Section 22); or an individual board member can be removed if 
s/he is voted out by board members (Section 23). The size of the board of directors of 
civil organisations at the national level is restricted to 35, and the maximum number of 
the board of supervisors is one-third of the number of the board of directors (Section 17). 
Figure 1 depicts the most common structural application of the board of directors and 
the board of supervisors. All members are at the same level within the organisations’ 
structure.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
The dual board system in Taiwan has several distinctive characteristics that differentiate 
it from two-tier board systems, such as those found in Germany, Demark, Japan, 
Netherlands, and China. For instance, supervisors in Germany have the power to 
appoint and remove directors (Bezemer et al., 2007; Schilling; 2001). In Demark, half 
of the number of supervisors can also be directors. In the dual board system of 
Taiwanese nonprofit organisations, the directors and supervisors are elected by 
organisational members. In other words, a director or a supervisor must be an 
organisational member. However, an organisational member can only be elected as 
either a director or a supervisor. A director can not be removed by the board of 
supervisors; this can only be done by the board of directors or the general assembly. 
 
Unlike the Taiwanese situation, where the board of directors and board of supervisors 
are deemed to have equal status, in China the status of supervisory boards is lower than 
the board of directors (Dahya et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004); while supervisory boards 
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in Germany have a higher status than management boards (Solomon et al., 2003). In 
Japan, the Commercial Code requires a company to have at least one “outside” statutory 
auditor who is not a director or employee of the company (Cooke & Sawa, 1998); there 
is no such requirement in the Civil Organisation Law of Taiwan.  
 
While governance research in Taiwan has been increasing in the last five years (Chen et 
al., 2007; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Solomon et al., 2003; Yeh & 
Woidtke, 2005), most of this research has focused on profit oriented corporations. 
Furthermore, research on supervisory boards has attracted relatively less attention than 
that on the board of directors. While the Taiwanese for-profit and nonprofit sectors both 
employ the dual board system, there are some significant differences in board 
governance. The Company Law stipulates publicly listed companies should have a 
minimum of two supervisors, but there is no minimum number of supervisors for 
general companies; and supervisors do not perform like a board but are more akin to 
individuals that are responsible for independent monitoring (Filatotchev et al., 2005; 
Solomon et al., 2003). This situation is similar to the function of supervisory boards in 
Japan (Filatotchev et al., 2005; Solomon et al., 2003). The Civil Organisation Law does 
stipulate a minimum number of supervisors for each nonprofit organisation, and in 
nonprofit organisations the board of supervisors must hold regular meetings and 
perform like a board, rather than as individuals.  
 
Board roles in dual board structures 
In the nonprofit setting, board member roles have been described by several authors 
(Cadbury, 2002; Carver, 1997; Houle, 1989; Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002) and include: to 
determine the organisation’s mission and policy; conduct strategic planning; 
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monitor/assess programs and services; appoint, monitor, evaluate, reward, replace and 
work with the executive; ensure that the organisation meets all legal requirements; 
secure financial resources and manage financial matters; manage the relationship with 
external environment; and conduct self-appraisals.  
 
An empirical study on board roles by the Charity Commission in England and Wales 
found that board effectiveness was associated with how well the board conducted five 
roles, namely: setting the organisation’s mission/values; helping raise funds or other 
resources; overseeing financial management; reviewing/deciding strategic directions; 
and reviewing board performance (Cornforth, 2001). ‘Checking propriety/legality, 
safeguarding assets/organisational missions, and accounting for expenditure’ (Cornforth 
and Edwards, 1999, p. 360) were recognized as the main roles of nonprofit directors. In 
research on Israeli nonprofit organisations, board roles were categorised into four 
factors: human resource management; maintenance of relationship with the task 
environment; policymaking and fiscal management; and fundraising (Iecovich, 2004).  
 
Inglis et al.’s seminal (1999) study of Canadian nonprofit organisations classified board 
roles of organisations into three groups: strategic activities; operations; and resource 
planning. Strategic activities included developing and assessing overall strategies, 
ensuring mission and vision, setting policies, evaluating the CEO, responding to 
community needs, developing collaboration and assessing itself. The operations 
functions included developing and delivering programs and services, advocating 
interests for certain groups and raising funds .The resource planning included allocating 
annual budget, hiring senior staff, and setting financial policy. All of these research 
efforts have been in the context of single tier board systems. 
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A number of studies have focused on the board of supervisors in the for-profit sector, 
including describing the role of supervisors (Cook & Sawa, 1998), internal and external 
service of the supervisory board (Bezemer et al., 2007), handling of the supervisory 
board (Schilling, 2001), the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance (Rose, 2005), development of the supervisory board (Koladkiewicz, 2001) 
and the independence of the supervisory board (Maassen & Van den Bosch, 1999).  
 
In one of the few empirical studies on supervisory boards in an Asia context, Dahya et 
al. (2003) examined the usefulness of the supervisory board of listed companies in 
China. Their research reported mixed results about the usefulness of the supervisory 
board. However, the supervisory board report was regarded by investors as a type of 
assurance and the absence of a supervisory board report could precipitate a drop in the 
share price because of investors’ loss of confidence. In consequence, they argued that a 
supervisory board was a valuable mechanism within listed companies.  
 
Dahya et al.’s (2003) research also categorised supervisors into four groups: honored 
guest; friendly advisor; censored watchdog; and independent watchdog. Most 
supervisory boards were categorised one of the first three types. The ‘honored guest’ 
board was a board in name only, its establishment a mere formality. ‘Friendly advisor’ 
supervisors were dependent on directors or the CEO and performed almost no 
monitoring tasks. The ‘censored watchdog’ supervisors conducted their duties diligently. 
Listed companies that had ‘independent-watchdog’ supervisors were typically operating 
with foreign individuals/companies investments and supervisors strictly performed their 
monitoring duties. Xiao et al. (2004) generated these same four types of supervisors 
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from 21 Chinese listed companies by using a grounded theory methodology. As 
directors are in a superior position to supervisors in China, Dahya et al. (2003) argued 
that supervisors need more power and should be more independent if organisations 
wanted them to perform a better job.  
 
These empirical studies from the nonprofit and for-profit sectors highlight the various 
roles performed by directors and supervisors. The common roles ascribed to boards of 
directors centre on the establishment of direction for their organisations, including 
setting the mission/vision, and providing direct advice to management. In addition, the 
board of directors also perform resource roles, such as raising funds, and performance 
evaluation roles, such as evaluating management. On the other hand, boards of 
supervisors were mainly responsible for performing supervision roles, such as 
monitoring financial accounts. However, the very few empirical studies have been 
conducted with sport organisations, where both directors and supervisors are elected by 
organisational members. The aim of this research was to explore how the dual board 
system operates in Taiwanese sport organisations, and to investigate the respective roles 




All 70 organisations listed by The National Council of Physical Fitness and Sports, 
R.O.C. (Taiwan), according to Taiwan’s Civil Organisation Law, were contacted for 
participate in this study. These organisations were civil organisations, nation-level 
organisations, representing different sport disciplines and all had a dual board system. 
All respondents were guaranteed individual and organisational anonymity. Ultimately, 
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board members from 24 organisations agreed to participate in this research. 
Participation involved completing a survey questionnaire about board roles.  
 
Instrument 
The survey questionnaire used in this research was devised based on Inglis et al.’s (1999) 
framework of board roles. Inglis et al.’s framework was developed based on extensive 
reviews of board roles in nonprofit organisations and its validity and reliability had been 
confirmed and this research therefore utilized Inglis et al’s framework as a foundation 
for board roles. However, their framework was primarily designed for a one-tier board 
system and the use of Inglis et al.’s framework may be questionable. To overcome this 
challenge, this research took the governance system of Taiwan into consideration.  
 
The Civil Organisation Law of Taiwan (section 17, 23 and 29) legislates certain board 
processes, including electing executive board members, electing a board chairman, 
ratifying board members’ resignation and attending board meetings but it does not 
stipulate any other roles of directors and supervisors. Civil organisations, including 
nonprofit sport organisations, are expected to privately regulate these roles (Section 18). 
In order to contextualize the questionnaire items, four issues related to these processes 
were added. Data on the gender and age of respondents on the board were also collected 
to delineate the profile of respondents. 
 
The questionnaire was initially written in English and then translated into Mandarin 
through backward and forward translations (Hayashi et al., 1992). A focus group 
interview was then conducted to assess content and clarity of the questionnaire and its 
application to the Taiwanese sport governance context. Two directors, two supervisors 
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and two general secretaries from six different Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations 
provided feedback. In the focus group interviews, interviewees argued that the 
questionnaire was mainly associated with the roles of directors and the questions of 
roles of supervisors should be asked by using another questionnaire or a separate section 
of questions. Modifications to the questionnaire were then made based on the 
interviewees’ comments and a number of additional questions related to the roles of 
supervisors were therefore developed. As a result, the focus group interview led to the 
development of two separate sets of questions, whereby members of boards of directors 
were asked to complete 21 questions and members of boards of supervisors were asked 
10 questions. 
 
A pilot study of the revised instrument was conducted with six current and previous 
board members and general secretaries of Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations. The 
questionnaire worked well and only minor modifications were made to improve the 
wording and clarity of the questions. Participants of the focus group interviews and the 
pilot were not included in the final data collection phase. 
 
Procedures 
The revised questionnaire was distributed to directors and supervisors through the 
participating organisations between September 2006 and January 2007. A 5-point scale 
(1=Strongly Disagree) measured the degree the respondent fulfilled each role in their 
respective organisation. Within the 24 nonprofit sport organisations contained a total of 
710 directors and 220 supervisors. Valid questionnaire responses were obtained from 
158 directors (22.25%) and 103 (46.82%) supervisors. 
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As the questionnaire developed for this study had not been tested with the target 
population, factor analysis was conducted to assess the underlying structure among the 
variables. As highlighted earlier, the dearth of reported research on Taiwanese board 
roles meant there was little precedent on the number of factors to be extracted from the 
analysis. Exploratory factor analysis was seen as appropriate (Hair et al., 2006) and the 
preferred sample size for factor analysis should be 100 or larger. The minimum sample 
size is to have at least 5 times as many participants as variables (Hair et al., 2006; 
Stevens, 2002). The number of variables of roles of directors and supervisors in this 
research were 21 and 10 respectively. Respective sample sizes of directors and 
supervisors in this present research were 158 and 103. The sample sizes were 7.5: 1 
ratio of directors to variables and 10:1 ratio of supervisors to variables, which both fell 
within acceptable limits.  
 
Results 
Of the respondents, the majority of directors were male (n=148, 93.7%), with only 6.3%  
female (n=10). Similarly, the majority of supervisors were male (n=95, 92.2%) with 
only 7.8% female supervisors (n=8). The majority of directors and supervisors were 
over the age of 50 years (65.8 % and 65.1 % respectively). Chi-square analysis of 
gender (χ2 (1) =.201, p=.654) and age (χ2 (1) =.017, p= .898) found that there was no 
significant difference between directors and supervisors.  
 
Roles of directors  
Responses about the roles of directors, derived through a series of analyses, ultimately 
fell into four categories, each containing several roles. The conduct of a factor analysis 
was deemed appropriate (Field, 2005; Hair et al., 2006) as the value of KMO (.883) was 
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in the acceptable range (greater than .5) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly 
significant (p<.001). Accordingly, the four factors whose eigenvalue over 1.0 were 
retained. Factor 1 explained 43.8 % of total variance and together the 4 retained factors 
represented 67.2 % of the variance of 21 variables. An oblique rotation (direct oblimin) 
was conducted to generate factor loadings which indicate the correlation between an 
original variable and its factor. A higher loading represents a strong relationship 
between variables. For interpretation purposes, we chose factor loadings with an 
absolute value of .40 or greater (Field, 2005; Pett, et al., 2003; Stevens, 2002). One 
variable failed to load significantly on any factors and it was eliminated (Pett et al., 
2003). After deleting this single variable, 20 variables remained and the model was 
changed. Therefore, there was a need to re-calculate the factor loadings (Hair et al., 
2006). 
 
Table 1 describes the second round of the factor analysis of roles of directors. Four 
factors were again retained. The percentage explained by each of four factors was 
43.3%, 10.5%, 7.9% and 5.7% percent respectively. All variables had factor loadings 
above .40. The highest correlation coefficient between factors was .560 therefore an 
oblique rotation was performed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
The first factor, labelled as Manage Vision and Purpose, had eight roles—allocate the 
annual budget, formulate a vision, examine the annual plan, formulate a mission, 
examine the overall strategy, examine the financial policy, examine sport services 
provided to members/society, and respond to members/society needs. The focus was on 
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roles regarding organisational direction and the purpose directors exist. In the second 
factor, Board Duty, directors performed three institutional duties: elect executive board 
members, elect the board chairman, and regularly attend the board meeting. The third 
factor, Human Resource and Fundraising, had seven roles including assigning work to 
the general secretary, evaluating the general secretary’s performance, hiring the general 
secretary, evaluating the board’s performance, raising funds, ratifying decisions made 
by the general secretary in hiring paid staff and ratifying directors’ resignation. The 
final factor, Stakeholder Focus, contained two roles with a focus on identifying and 
satisfying the needs of members and society; both are key stakeholders of nonprofit 
sport organisations (Blair, 1995; Clarke, 1998).  
 
Roles of supervisors  
The roles of supervisors were less diverse than the board of directors and ultimately 
were categorized into two areas. The analyses used the same assumptions as outlined 
above for the board of directors analysis.  The value of KMO was .872 and results of the 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was significant (p<.001), therefore, conducting a factor 
analysis of roles of supervisors was also appropriate (Field, 2005; Hair et al., 2006). 
There were two factors having eigenvalues greater than 1. Factor 1 explained 52.5 % of 
total variance; Factor 2 accounted for 10.5 % of total variance. The two factors 
represented 63.0% of the variance of 10 variables. Direct Oblimin rotation was again 
employed to rotate matrix and variables with a factor loading of .40 and above were 
considered. One variable had a cross loading on Factors 1 and 2. Kline (2000) suggested 
that because of difficulties in interpreting the scale, cross-loading variables should be 
eliminated. After deleting this one variable, nine variables remained and the model was 
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changed. Therefore, there was a need to re-calculate the factor loadings (Hair et al., 
2006).  
 
Table 2 presents the second round of the factor analysis of roles of supervisors, where 
two factors were again retained. The percentage explained by each of two factors was 
53.2 % and 11.6 % respectively. Variables all had factor loadings above .40 and cross 
loadings were not found. The correlation coefficient between two factors was .477. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
The first factor, Monitoring Results, included five roles: review of annual budgets; 
supervise properly use of funds; final accounts review; supervisors’ resignation 
ratification; and major purchasing decision supervision. The second factor, Board Duty 
and Process, consisted of four roles: regular board meeting attendance; presentation of 
results of organisational performance at the general assembly; board meeting 
presentation of results of organisational performance; and election of executive 
supervisors.  
 
The mean and standard deviation of the board roles from the sample of sport 
organisations are shown in Table 3. In general, the respondents means fall in the 3-4 
range on the 5-point scale. The directors were relatively more focused on Board Duty; 
the supervisors were relatively more committed to Board Duty and Process. For the 
overall scale of roles of directors α = .93. Within each of these scales, the α ranged 
from .66 to .91. For the scale of roles of supervisors α = .89. Within each of these scales, 
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the α were .87 and .77 respectively. These coefficients were considered to be 
satisfactory (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This investigation of board roles in Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations with a dual 
board system generated four factors for roles of directors and two factors for the roles of 
supervisors. The executive level leadership status of the board of directors/supervisors 
to the secretary department was evidenced through several board roles, namely, hiring 
the general secretary, assigning work to the general secretary, evaluating the general 
secretary’s performance, and supervising whether funds are used properly. Roles related 
to members/society and fundraising demonstrated that board members were expected to 
bring resources and serve as a conduit between their organisation and external 
environment. Several roles, such as electing the board chairman, attending board 
meetings and ratifying board members’ resignation were also performed by both 
directors and supervisors.  
 
The results demonstrate that board members conduct their roles as prescribed by 
Taiwan’s Civil Organisation Law. The secretary department enacts the initiatives taken 
in the director’s board room that involve setting the organisation’s vision, mission, 
strategy, policy and plan. The primary roles of the supervisory board were underpinned 
by the notion that funds should be monitored and reported on by an independent body 
that was not involved in raising or allocating revenue.  
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Table 4 displays the comparisons between Inglis et al.’s (1999) framework and the 
board roles in the dual board system identified by this study. It is evident that there are 
some subtle differences in the roles of directors between the dual board system and one-
tier board systems. For example, in this dual board study assigning work to the general 
secretary was a role performed by directors, yet this was not found in Inglis et al.’s 
(1999) framework nor in previous sport governance research. Similarly, some 
operational roles of supervisors, such as supervising major purchasing decisions, were 
not found in Inglis et al.’s (1999) framework nor in previous for profit and/or nonprofit 
literature examining one-tier board systems.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Some of the roles of directors identified by this research were similar to roles found by 
previous studies of one-tier board systems, such as formulating a mission/vision 
(Cornforth, 2001; Dulewicz & Herbert, 1999; Inglis et al., 1999); examining the overall 
strategy (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006); responding to member/society needs (Inglis et 
al., 1999); and evaluating the general secretary’s performance (Van den Heuvel et al., 
2006). Certain roles of supervisors found in the current study, such as presenting results 
of organisational performance at the general assembly (Koladkiewicz, 2001), were also 
identified by previous research on dual board systems. In other words, some roles in the 
one-tier and two-tier board systems were common to the dual board system. However, 
this study has demonstrated that roles of board members in a one-tier board system are 
not wholly aligned with those in a dual board system. Additionally, the study has 
reinforced the benefits of a dual board system where the carriage of monitoring roles by 
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a separate board, the board of supervisors, acts as a governance assurance mechanism. 
The dual board provides for the separation of supervision from management.  
 
Moreover, the roles of directors and supervisors within the dual board system were 
different. Overall, the main role played by directors is to provide support and directions 
that assist their respective organisations to function; whereas supervisors are mostly 
involved in monitoring tasks. Compared to supervisors, directors work more closely 
with the secretary and executive departments. Most of the roles that supervisors perform 
centre on supervising the “team” formed by directors and the secretary’s department, in 
terms of supervising funds allocation. The supervisory board is not involved in 
managerial activities. The board of supervisors assumes the role of a “third party” in 
order to prevent becoming part of the team and to ensure they can supervise the team 
independently.  
 
Raising funds is one of the roles performed by directors in nonprofit organisations. This 
role was, perhaps unsurprisingly, not found in for-profit organisations but has been 
identified in other nonprofit research (Iecovich, 2004; Inglis et al., 1999). In general, the 
mission of nonprofit sport organisations is to provide services to members/society at a 
low price or without any fee. In this context it is important for nonprofit board members 
to access and maintain financial resources.  
 
Moreover, the factor analysis demonstrated that a director/supervisor plays a variety of 
roles in an organisation. For example, a director assumes a leadership role in 
formulating the organisation’s vision/mission; setting the annual plan requires executive 
thinking; in assigning work to the general secretary director’s assume management 
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responsibility; evaluating the general secretary’s performance requires a performance 
management approach; regular attendance and contributions to board meetings to 
monitor performance against member expectations and strategic plans; and director’s 
act as stewards for members and societal needs, and so on. A supervisory board member 
assumes the role of an assessor when they review the annual budget; the role of a 
monitor when supervising major purchasing decisions; and an organisational citizen 
through regularly attending board meetings and ensuring enduring organisational value.  
 
In the dual board system directors and supervisors perform multiple roles in the 
organisation and fundamentally have different responsibilities. A director is expected to 
engage in a greater variety of roles than a supervisor, and a director should have an 
understanding of his/her roles, particularly the differences between a leader, examiner, 
manager, evaluator, organisational citizen and mediator. Three key roles, assessor, 
monitor and organisational citizen, are generally performed by supervisors. As such, a 
board director arguably has a relatively greater workload than a board of supervisors 
member although they are both volunteers and hold the same ‘status’ in the organisation. 
 
These results can assist nonprofit sport organisations to understand the varied nature of 
board roles and to develop role descriptions for board members. In particular, this 
further elaboration of board roles can be used in decisions about recruiting and 
inducting new board members, and to identity candidates that can perform the varied 
roles required. An accurate role description will allow prospective board members to 
gain a clear perspective on the roles they would need to engage in, and from a selection 
viewpoint if the voting assembly know what is required of board members they can 
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make better informed decisions about appropriate selection and election of board 
members.  
 
The differentiation of tasks and roles identified in this paper can be used to inform the 
induction process of new board members, and to provide clarity on the roles they are 
expected to perform. For directors, this could entail highlighting the variety of board 
roles, particularly the attributes associated with being a leader, examiner, manager, 
evaluator, organisational citizen and mediator. For supervisors, three key roles, assessor, 
monitor and organisational citizen are relevant. During the research process it was 
identified that board training and provision of support material was minimal. Therefore, 
it is suggested that training workshops of returning and new board members could be 
arranged to help board members better understand their roles. A role description 
handbook that articulates each position and is made available to each board member 
would also be of benefit.  
 
This research supports the argument that there is no one size-fits-all guideline of board 
roles. Many dimensions of governance, such as board systems, can have an impact on 
performance of board roles. If the most important spirit of performing board roles relies 
on the fundamental definition of governance to help an organisation run properly 
(Tricker, 1984), then it is incumbent on organisations to design board roles according to 
the requirements of the legislative or regulatory system to which they are bound, as well 
as the purpose and capacity of their organisation.  
 
It should be noted that there were several limitations in this study. The participants in 
this research were drawn from 70 associations on the list of the National Council of 
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Physical Fitness and Sports. Board members from 24 associations took part in this 
research, thus board members from the other 46 associations and other national sport 
associations were not included. Within the 24 associations, 158 directors (response rate 
= 20.7%) were sent the first round questionnaire. While the sample size was sufficient 
for the statistical approaches employed by this research, the relatively low response rate 
may lead to a problem of generalization of the results to the national population of 
nonprofit sport associations. In addition, as the study participants were exclusively 
nonprofit sport organisations, the conclusions are not necessarily directly generalizable 
to other nonprofit organisations.  
 
The dual board system maximises the possibility of fulfilling the many functions that a 
board is expected to perform. In dividing its functions amongst two boards the dual 
board creates a system in which each board is directly responsible for performing a 
subset of functions, with the monitoring component clearly distinguishable from the 
unitary board approach.  
 
Future research should investigate the rationale for particular board composition and 
determine if this is related to board effectiveness. Moreover, results of this research 
could inform the government and the public of Taiwan about the governance practices 
employed by nonprofit sport organisations. Countries that intend to establish a dual 
board system could use these results as a basis on which to regulate their board’s roles 
and further formulate role descriptions for boards. This study has shown that the dual 
board system is a dual protection system.  Future research could also examine whether 
organisations with a dual board system have better performance outcomes than those 
with a single tier board system. 
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A Board of Directors A Board of Supervisors 
A General Secretary 
The Secretary Department 
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Allocate the annual budget  .809 a .102 -.025 .355 
Formulate a vision  .806 -.124 -.090 -.113 
Examine the annual plan  .753 .215 .154 -.182 
Formulate a mission  .738 -.182 -.106 -.090 
Examine the overall strategy  .736 .104 .024 -.254 
Examine the financial policy  .702 -.044 -.207 .224 
Examine sport services provided to members/society  .670 .046 -.099 -.186 
Respond to members/society needs  .583 -.057 -.247 -.220 
Elect executive board members -.087 .803 -.162 -.003 
Elect the board chairman  .070 .750 -.174 .202 
Regularly attend the board meeting  .067 .663 .157 -.179 
Assign work to the general secretary  -.005 -.053 -.865 .043 
Evaluate the general secretary’s performance  .024 .169 -.812 -.047 
Hire the general secretary  -.064 .151 -.795 -.199 
Evaluate the board’s performance  .079 .038 -.743 -.008 
Raise funds  .102 -.120 -.634 -.203 
Ratify decisions made by the general secretary in hiring paid 
staff  .335 -.210 -.589 .135 
Ratify directors’ resignation  .112 .384 -.542 .203 
Satisfy the need of members/society  .207 .049 -.143 -.742 
Identify the needs of members/society .224 .016 -.285 -.674 
Eigenvalues 8.668 2.089 1.586 1.135 
Percentage variance  43.34 10.45 7.93 5.68 
a Factor Loading
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Board Duty and Process 
 
 
Review the annual budget .870 a -.046 
Supervise major purchasing decisions   .848 .050 
Review the final account .765 .165 
Ratify supervisors’ resignation   .696 .266 
Supervise major purchasing decisions .686 -.114 
Regularly attend the board meeting  -.184 .898 
Present results of organisational performance at the general assembly   .211 .705 
Present results of organisational performance at the board meeting  .221 .672 
Elect executive supervisors  .357 .433 
Eigenvalues 4.784 1.043 
Percentage variance  53.16 11.59 
a Factor Loading
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Reliability for Board Roles  
 
 










Roles of directors   .93 
Manage Vision and Purpose 3.68 .78 .91 
Board Duty 4.35 .69 .66 
Human Resource and Fundraising 3.13 .86 .89 
Stakeholder Focus 3.80 .85 .82 
Roles of supervisors   .89 
Monitoring Results 3.94 .70 .87 
Board Duty and Process 4.25 .66 .77 
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Board of Directors 
 
Board of Supervisors 
Allocate the annual budget  √ √  
Formulate a vision  √ √  
Examine the annual plan  √ √  
Formulate a mission  √ √  
Examine the overall strategy  √ √  
Examine the financial policy  √ √  
Examine sport services provided to members/society  √ √  
Respond to members/society needs  √ √  
Elect executive board members  √  
Elect the board chairman   √  
Regularly attend board meetings   √  
Assign work to the general secretary   √  
Evaluate the general secretary’s performance  √ √  
Hire the general secretary   √  
Evaluate the board’s performance   √  
Raise funds  √ √  
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Ratify decisions made by the general secretary in hiring 
paid staff  
√ √  
Ratify directors’ resignations   √  
Satisfy the needs of members/society  √ √  
Identify the needs of members/society  √  
Liaison Role  √  
Responsibility for athletes  √ √  
Review the annual budget   √ 
Supervise whether funds are used properly     √ 
Review the final account   √ 
Ratify supervisors’ resignations     √ 
Supervise major purchasing decisions   √ 
Regularly attend board meetings   √ 
Present results of organisational performance at the 
general assembly   
  √ 
Present results of organisational performance at the 
board meeting  
  √ 
Elect executive supervisors    √ 
Oversee the progress of the annual plan   √ 
Ensure regulation abidance   √ 
Deliver specific programs and services √   
 
 
